very interesting talk by Howard Rheingold about human cooperation, and how new forms of media can shape the way we interact with humans..and non humans "Howard Rheingold talks about the coming world of collaboration, participatory media and collective action -- and how Wikipedia is really an outgrowth of our natural human instinct to work as a group. As he points out, humans have been banding together to work collectively since our days of hunting mastodons."
Gell structures his discussion of art around ‘abduction of agency’ as a necessary mode for interaction with artifacts, casting humans into complex actor-effector networks of “distributed personhood”. If one is to be a ‘distributed person,’ though, the inaccuracies of the actor-artifact interface typical of the abduction mechanism are highly undesirable. One must know the real states of one’s components in order to function effectively. In the same way that one must be sure that the signals from one’s own body have concrete causal origins and associated definite meaning in order to choreograph any physical action, one must have confidence in the meaningful and significant nature of communication between distributed components.
Since these networked artifacts are incapable of reformatting the way they present the distributed person with signs of their presence, status and significance, it falls to the person to actively submit to the abstractions and abduction of causational logic needed for maintaining the necessary flow of information-signs between the components of the distributed individual.
A particularly interesting, uniquely modern and easily examined example is the virtualized computer graphical user interface (GUI), wherein the signs and modes of contact between the person and the computer is entirely abstracted from the realities of both the person’s intent and the computer’s mechanical functions. A human mind would never stratify information in the manner of a computer’s data structure, so the abstraction of ‘folders’ is introduced, allowing the human to interact with data stratification in a mode requiring little depth of functional understanding. What is significant is that for both the computer and the human, the idea of the ‘folder’ is an untruth, bearing little to no relation to the actual structures involved for either party, yet an untruth that allows the useful meshing of the computer’s mechanical effectiveness and the human’s ability to acquire and interact with data dynamically.
From this type of mechanism, it is interesting to note, arise useful formalizations that bear meaning exclusively in the context of the interface itself, with the ramifications accepted passively by either involved party. A good example of this is the ‘drag-and-drop’ concept. This bears analogical relation to human methodology, in that it standardizes a formal set of spatial relationships in a similar (albeit grossly simplified) graphical way to physical space, yet is obviously an artificial construct (i.e. no human would confuse physically moving items from one place to another with virtual drag-and-drop reallocation of data). The human, as such, must passively submit to the casual redefinition of physical and informational laws that is unique to this interface. Similarly, the computer must passively submit to the rules of data movement set by the interface, even though the binary operations involved are significantly more complex, and very differently structured than the graphical motion conducted by the actor-human.
It may seem that only the subject-interactor (in this case, the computer) performs this passive submittal to the unique laws of the interface. Certainly it is the case that the computer has no choice or agency in this submittal. It must be noted, however, that it is a bidirectional action of compromise that allows this interface to function at all. Consider the abject bewilderment on the part of many who use a computer for the first time, or those who have grown up unaccustomed to the laws of the GUI. Asking an elderly woman using a computer for the first time to ‘drag and drop’ something, ‘open’ a 'file', ‘double-click’ an ‘icon’… all these conventions are utterly confusing unless one has been trained in the ability to passively submit to them.
A key point of consideration is the fact that this formalized submittal to the interface is very distinct from any actual knowledge of the partner-interactor, other than the general knowledge of its existence. While most moderns regularly utilize the GUI, it is an extremely small minority that actually knows how the formalized interactions of the interface restructure the physical data on the other side. Moreover, nothing in the GUI is aimed at communicating or training the human participant in an understanding of digital data structures, nor educating the computer in how a human thinks, instead forcing the two distinct and complex entities to communicate in a highly ritualized virtual arena. It must be noted, lastly, that this paradigm is showing signs of change with the advent of adaptive interface technologies. It will be very interesting to note the directions this gradual progression takes, as well as the impact it has on the very concept of ‘human’ and ‘computer.’
The idea of art being "non-humans as distributed humans" is very relevant to blogging and other kinds of internet communication. In Art and Agency, Gell explains “distributed personhood” – the idea that, like cicada with their shed exoskeletons, people too have parts of themselves not necessarily attached by tissue or muscle. The blog world is full of such excuviae, in the sense that blogs are a space where people map out parts of themselves, their lives, their interests. Such excuviae serve as indexes, “entit[ies] from which the observer can make…an inference about the intentions or capabilities of another person” (13). Blogs whose authors have abandoned them or forgotten the password, but which nonetheless remain posted on the internet for the public to see, probably most fit the Gell-ian concept of excuviae. Because of their temporal and mental distance from their authors, abandoned blogs better fit the description of excuviae as “physically detached fragments of…‘distributed personhood’ – that is, personhood distributed in the milieu, beyond the body-boundary” (104).
In this sense, excuviae sorcery seems like it could be analogous to internet interaction. “The interest in excuviae sorcery,” Gell explains, “is that it forges a direct link between the index as an image of the prototype, and the index as a (detached) part of the prototype” (104). Though it seems intuitive and obvious that someone’s instant message or facebook comment originates directly from a “speaker,” internet communication does create fragments of someone’s thoughts and words, distinct from the speaker him- or herself. What is typed has the potential to be permanent in a way that spoken words (unless they are recorded) do not. There is also the potential to be anonymous – and thus further detached the index from the person – by using pseudonyms to make excuviae (somewhat) untraceable to their authors. “Excuviae sorcery is possible,” writes Gell, “because of the fact that as the body grows, it sheds its parts, and these become distributed around the ambience” (108). It is clear from Gell’s description of the generation of simulacra as “the shedding of ephemeral skins from all things induced by a kind of “pushing” from within” that these “parts” do not have to be physical, organic material (108). In this sense, blogs are a part of the hau of the internet.
The idea of blogs as indexes and excuviae is strengthened by Gell's discussion of witnessing as agency. Gell uses the Hindu concept of darshan to illustrate how sight can be seen as “an ‘extromissive’’ sense, the eye sending out invisible beams or rays through the air” (117). “Seeing creates a physical bridge between one being and another” (117). Because blogs are visible, and often visible to anyone among the huge public of the internet, blogs enable the creation of countless physical bridges between being and the excuviae or indexes of other beings.
Facebook is another example of an index. Facebook profiles are often meticulously sculpted and arranged by their agents, to convey a certain, specific impression to others. Facebook seems like a kind of excuviae, but I think it would be more accurate to call facebook, specifically the facebook profile, an idol. An aniconic idol, specifically, because the facebook profile is not supposed to represent a human figure, but, rather, the personality, habits and values of the person being represented. Facebook profiles are not worshipped in a religious sense, but they do embody the idea that “eye-contact, mutual looking, is a basic mechanism for intersubjectivity because to look into another’s eyes is not just to see the other, but to see the other seeing you (I see you see me see you see me etc.)” (120). This eye-contact effect applies more, I think, to the relationship between an individual and his or her own profile, in that people look at their own profiles not as representations of themselves (as subject) but as other people would see their profile (as objects). This comparison that I’m drawing is definitely limited – it’s debatable to what extent a viewer of a facebook profile feels seen by the person represented by the facebook profile – but I do think it lines up roughly with Gell’s ideas.
A potential criticism of this analogy I’m drawing between internet communication and excuviae would be that the properties I describe as properties of blogs are in fact properties of any written material. I think that is certainly true, following Gell’s proposal that things that are created serve as indexes of their creators. However, there are two ways in which blogs seem to go a step further into Gell’s definition of excuviae than the bulk of written material does. First, the internet, like the Maori forest, is a space that the public understand as housing, among other things, the excuviae, or hau, of internet users. There is no such expansive, universal and universally accessible space for other kinds of written material. Second, the fact of universal accessibility makes possible an almost infinite number of connections – witnessings and interactions – between indexes, primary agents, secondary agents and patients, and this possibility does not exist with other kinds of writing.
I'm taking a course on Conception and the Fetus, where we've been talking a lot about ideas of fetal personhood, how that's related to the use of ultrasound technology, and how pregnant women, their partners, and medical personnel react to and form relationships with these ultrasound images. In reading the chapters from Gell, I couldn't help but return to the idea of the ultrasound image, and it's status as a sort of idol in the religious sense Gell discusses.
Perhaps because I was a big fan of dolls as a child, I was really able to relate to the use of the little girl's doll to illustrate the idea that "persons form what are evidently social relations with 'things.' " Gell's argument of this social relationship humans form with 'things' goes beyond things that are "representation[s] of a human being, as a doll is." (18). The degree to which the image of a fetus on an ultrasound monitor is a representation of a human being can be debated. On the one hand, it can be (and is) argued that ultrasound images ARE representations of a human being (in the same way a photograph or painting of an adult is such a representation). On the other, the images produced by ultrasound technology often look less human, in a way, than even the little girl's doll.
In talking about idol worship, Gell states, "thus, in image-worship, the devotee does not just see the idol, but sees herself (as an object) being seen by the idol (as a subject). The idol's 'seeing' is built into the devotee's own self-awareness at one remove as the object which is seen by the idol." (120). During an ultrasound in the US, it is not uncommon for technicians or the future parents to claim that "the baby's waving hello!" or, if a fetus is positioned so that its sex cannot be determined, it might be said that "the baby is modest!" or "uncooperative". Similarly, if a good view of the face cannot be found, the fetus might be termed "camera shy" or "not wanting his picture taken." Clearly, these are attributes projected onto the ultrasound image by humans. In a sense, we might think of the ultrasound image as an idol, and the humans looking at the ultrasound as worshippers of that image. That a move of a fetal hand is seen as a wave hello is akin to the devotee "see[ing] herself being seen by the idol." The ultrasound image can no better see the pregnant woman than a stone idol can see its devotee.
Gell maps out his argument of art as index in chapter 2. It indexes multiple phenomena, including representation of another person or object, aesthetic value, the responsibility of the creator of the work of art, and other cultural entities and phenomena that come to mind when in contact with the art. Of particular interest to me is the discussion of eyes in art and artistic representation. Gell makes the point that viewers, even non-religious viewers speak of art using vocabulary fitting to a subject with agency. The art is 'looking at me' or some other acting verb. Gell also speaks of the eyes specifically when discussing Hindi Darshan and the experience of looking at the idol and having it look back. "Darshan is thus very much a two-way affair. The gaze directed by the god towards the worshipper confers his blessing; conversely, the worshipper reaches out a touches the god. The result is union with the god, a merging of consciousness according to the devotionalist interpretation." (117) According to Caraka, we "indeed have only one sense, the sense of touch, of which sight, hearing, etc. are just more subtle forms." (117) Seeing, like touching, is a form of contact... This is something very much palpable when viewing art and my favorite part of the piece...
Gell’s work was very interesting, although I felt that Chapter 2 was a bit easier to follow than Chapter 7. On the whole, it was tougher to get through than past readings.
I feel that Gell has a strong grasp on the practical and “logical”, in that he understands that it is somewhat controversial to propose that a piece of art is an agent. He works through this in a careful and methodical manner. I like his emphasis on “physical mediation, which always does exploit the manifold causal properties of the ambient physical world…” (20), showing the important link between what one thinks, and how that is manifested onto the world.
In Chapter 7, I really enjoyed his discussion on Darsan, as I took a class on Hinduism last semester. There is certainly a lot of prejudice against image-heavy religions, and a lot of misunderstanding. I think that it is important for people to understand the way in which the idols are viewed within their religious context (in accordance with Gell’s distinction between items that are biologically alive versus spiritually alive). Furthermore, I was intrigued by his explanation that certain rituals gain meaning because they are so unique and unusual (i.e. the washing, dressing, and fanning of idols).
Gell had many points to make, and it was a little hard sometimes to understand how they all fit together under a similar theme. I feel that it would be very helpful to discuss in class how his many different ideas come together. ~Samantha
As a whole I found the Gell really engaging and interesting to work through. His theory is a useful piece to read in the beginning of our explorations into posthuman relationships, because it gives a clear and detailed anthropological and ethnographic look into the specifics of how these complications and issues are exercised within one area - visible (art) indexes.
Of particular interest was Gell's final conclusion that the infinite and unconscious transfers between humans and 'works of art' allow for the possibility that both can fill the same role in "networks of human social agency", and be seen as "almost entirely equivalent" (153). This discrepancy between the biologically living/non-living and the ability to index and hold agency brings into question one of the fundamental tools that we use to view the world around us. To stop seeing divisions within things based on six scientific characteristics of life (cells, organization, energy use, homeostasis, growth, and reproduction) and instead recognize that all things are living in this different meaning of the word.
I find the word abduction perfect for this task of transferring agencies between things because if we no longer consider ourselves living in the same biological manner then so much of our agency is taken away (for we can't claim to have the ability to dominate non-living items within the environment). Looking from the other perspective though, it gives humans much more agency because the amount of life strains and indexes that we 'touch' are greatly increased. This means more access to things external to us and with that we in turn have more ability to reflect that agency into other patients (retracing the cycle of changing patients and agents).
First of all, "Machines to Match Man by 2029," they will even make us smarter! : http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/7248875.stm
I was very interested in Gell's understanding and acknowledgment of perspective. At the beginning of Chapter 2, he includes a discussion of art as social because it springs from and engages with the human mind, which is itself social, in that it is only comprehendible in a social context. He implies that our perceptions of art are directly related and exchanged for our our perceptions of society. This chapter resonated with me in that Gell seemed aware of society's relationship with art. Something about art, even more so than other objects, strikes our cognition and allows us to not only assign it human qualities but also treat it like a person.
As an object, art can become an expression of idolatry. Interesting thought, especially in just having understood Godelier's definition of idolatry as giving a material more "agency" and human authority than actual human beings (whatever those may be). In fact, this article engaged with Godelier quite often in that respect, in that there is a discussion of humans ascribing agency to art, or rather surrendering our own agency and gifting it to an object.
Gell mentions this "attribution of agency" as human agency manifested in materials by way of human use, perception or even idolatry. Because objects cannot themselves be "self-sufficient agents" insofar as they do not have social minds or consciousness, they hence become secondary agents, wrought with the authority and the importance that humans perceive them to have in a social context.
Art, especially, is placed in a higher level of materialism wherein it receives equality and at some points, idolatry from human beings. In our society, we often assign art intentions (qualification for agency). We say that art contains messages breathed in by the (human) artist. On Page 23, Gell makes the interesting point that "art objects manufactured by human beings are not believed to have originated in that way; they are thought to be of divine origin or to have mysteriously made themselves." This took me back to Latour, who, in an explanation of nonhumans speaking as actors for humans said: "Novelists claim that they are forced to write either by a muse or by the sheer impulse of the characters themselves... novelists play the expressive role of medium" (pragmatogonies, 794). All of this points me to Godelier's idea of using materials to express or construct an imaginary personality. We use objects not only practically but expressively, so much so that they become our stand-ins, and we as humans (our bodies, perhaps even our minds) become the less important factors of society.
Central to Gell’s argument about the power of the “art object” is the idea of reflection, as in the type of reflection that is familiar to us through a mirror. A reflection itself is distorted and can never equal that which it is representing; as opposed to the actual object or person being reflected, the reflection itself is always a distorted vision of the original. Gell explains, “eye-contact, mutual looking, is a basic mechanism for intersubjectivity because to look into another’s eyes is not just to see the other, but to see the other seeing you…” (p. 120) The cycle continues on infinitely and the struggle for dominance is a conflicting and often contradictory one. If I am looking at the object, then I am the observer and that object becomes subject to my gaze. However, as soon as I realize that the object is looking back at me, I become subject to the object that can now see me watching it and I lose the larger control.
By using this example of the mirror an object or work of art creates into the lives of those who created the object, Gell argues that those objects are in themselves mediators intertwined yet independent from agency on a pure human to human level. The issue of sight is inherently significant when discussing objects; if one is to say that an object has the capacity to embody a certain power, it is necessary to also say that the physical existence of the object is vital in determining its character. Yet there is an extent to which an object can never be trusted; there is always the question of whether the art-object is a reflection or is being reflected, and is therefore full of a level of distortion that is inescapable. If the object sees, then who are we to say that their vision of us is less true or real than our superimposed vision of ourselves on them?
I found Gell’s arguments and theories running a close encounter to Bruno Latour. In particular when he discusses the agency of art and objects is reliant on the social relations within a given context. That is, in the social it is the human agent who brings inferences or “abductions” to art objects that are seen as an “indexical sign” for a particular meaning which is highly dependant upon the context. Gell proceeds to discuss this notion in relation to religion and things that are endowed with scared meanings. I was completely drawn into this idea as Gell writes, “Humanity has a lien on God because his objectification is in their hands.” To me, I understand this statement as saying that without the human agency that idolizes images or scared objects then the agency that these non-human things take on would be obsolete. Therefore, this is why the agency of objects is relational within humanity, and also without the religious context an image of God would just be a picture perhaps taking on meaning (agency) in a different context... It is weird to view religions with this theory in mind, as I have, and am sure many others as well, come from so sort of religious background. Yet, once you wrap your mind around this notion it makes complete sense.
On that contextual note, a friend of mine works in a gallery in Chelsea that specializes in contemporary art. And it is amazing to discuss with her the high monetary value a specific art community places on these art objects. Yet, remove the context and put the artwork in another setting, the pieces are likely not be seen with the same agency as they are viewed when put in the gallery in Chelsea. Also, this particular gallery that she works at the name of it has its own agency in that art buyers will simply agree to a price just because of its connection to the gallery. In that sense the gallery has more or less morphed into brand, label that was mediated my human agency.
Gell's coup de grace occurs, in my opinion, on p. 103: "We suffer, as patients, from forms of agency mediated via images of ourselves, because, as social persons, we are present, not just in our singular bodies, but in everything in our surroundings which bears witness to our existence, our attributes, and our agency." This is a brilliant example offered by Gell to explain why people irrationally resist how we are represented, via photos, for example. (S. Kracauer makes a similar argument in On Photography about 'reification,' and Adorno would put a twist on this notion in his own discussion of 'mimesis'... both Kracauer & Adorno actually would agree with Gell, but the harmful effects of this kind of 'mimetic representation' for K & A were more real, as they wove into this a political element... more on this in class...)
As apt as this example is, I admit I am not fully convinced of Gell's hypothesis, although it's original and brilliant. Perhaps I'm being pig-headed about it, but it seems as though he's building his case upon unsound foundations. Namely, how index & abduction works. Actually, I have no problem with the notion of 'index.' I also understand that from a common-sensical perspective, the process of abduction happens. All the time, in fact. But as Gell himself admits, the proceess of abduction is a logical fallacy. If P then Q does NOT necessarily mean Q then P. It may or may not, as Gell himself is well aware of. Yet Gell fails to make this fine distinction in the rest of the essay. Example: "Any artefact, by virtue of being a manufactured thing, motivates an abduction which specifies the identity of the agent... manufactured objects are 'caused' by their makers, just as smoke is caused by fire (p. 23) NO. Just as the smoke may or may not be caused by fire (can be caused by dry ice, let's say) the manufactured objects may or may not be caused by their makers.
What's problematic here is that this line of argument allows Gell to make the agent-patient variables fluidly fungible. I'm not ready to accept that unless the logical crease is straightened.
The Toyota analogy was a perfect example of this. I can surely understand how Gell gets on with his Toyollie, but I sure don't feel that way with my car. But I felt that way with other objects before. I think this only proves that abduction is not a necessarily true conditional process. Which is also the reason why I cannot really accept his notions about mines and soldiers as given in this excerpt from his book. I agree that the mines are conduits (Gell's own term, which I think is perfect) but the transference of agency from person to thing is built on shaky grounds, at least from what I read so far.
Towards the beginning of Chapter 2, Gell establishes how “things” can act as social agents using the examples of a small girl’s doll and a family car. He says that a young girl’s relationship with her doll is “an archetypal instance of the subject-matter of the anthropology of art.” While I found this to be an interesting and hilarious example, I’m hesitant to fully accept Gell’s portrayal of this relationship…I’m not sure how important this is - I don’t think that his oversimplified portrayal of the girl-doll relationship undermines his overall arguments about art and agency, although he does seem to jump from girl-doll to adult-sculpture very quickly and I wanted to think a little more about this foundational example.
Gell writes, “Consider a little girl with her doll. She loves her doll. Her doll is her best friend (she says).” Gell assumes this behavior to be typical, but it strikes me as sort of the stereotypical little girl behavior in a movie. Important to the little girl’s relationship with her doll, which relates to how the doll is a “representation of a human being,” is the little girl’s perspective on the world, which includes a different understanding of the self in relation to other people and objects. When I was young, I wasn’t best friends with my dolls, but I spent hours doing serious “operations” on them for various serious illnesses. My fascination with dolls had a lot to do with a confusion about the ways that that dolls were or were not different from myself and my family, and I didn’t view them with the same awareness of their object-ness that a museum attendee would view David. In fact, when I think about it, to some extent I might have had an easier time following Gell’s arguments if I still retained some of that childhood mindset where I did view dolls as both patients and agents at different times. Perhaps growing up and being “socialized” has made it harder for me to recognize the agency of objects that I used to fully accept. Now that I’m writing this post, I do think that the relationship between little girls and dolls is an interesting one to study in regard to agency and social relationships between people and “things,” though because of the important disparity between the mindset of a child and the mindset of an adult, I think it’s a little unfair when Gell asks, “But what is David if it is not a big doll for grown-ups?”
Gell’s analysis makes clear many of the questions and misconceptions I’ve been struggling to work through. Though I’m still unpacking the implications of what I’ve read, his conception of ‘index, abduction, primary agents, agent/patient relations etc.’ finally makes it possible to visualize the stuff we’ve been talking about in class. I had mostly been confused (or perhaps taken a bit too literally) the idea of symmetry between people and objects. I hadn’t been clear in what sense ‘symmetry’ was being used. I’ve interpreted Gell’s argument to imply that people and things might be symmetrical in the sense that one can not exist without the other, or an organism cannot exist without its vital organs. Yet, these components differ in their individual functions (as there are primary agents and secondary agents) which are to be distinguished from ‘happenings’ and physical laws. What they share in common is the idea that both people and things are entities with “the capacity to initiate causal events in his/her vicinity.” (21). For me, this subtle distinction is a totally different way of seeing everyday objects I rely upon. Something I haven’t quite grasped then is : what are the implications of reascribing agency (the capacity to initiate causal events) to non-human objects? How does this change the way I interact with them?
We're running into the recurring theme of complete autonomy in respect to the concept of 'self'. Not in the sense of this concept being independent of other definitions, or the constructed schemes of interaction for these other defined things, but in the sense of it having a sovereign self-hood. Godelier referenced this in his explanation of the necessity for the 'human' quality endowed on a sacred object - thus suggesting an inherent 'human' origin, a base template of sorts. On the other hand, Latour understands this inherent humanity not as the elemental engine of all things but as a definite part, an identifiable role in the mechanics of the social construct. Gell's lands somewhere inbetween, where humans are cogs in the clockwork, and still perhaps the engineers (however unintentional) of their part in the machine, his 'agency' and so forth is dependent on the assumed presence of the human intiative, that which finds the found objects, that first pushes the rock down the hill.
Unfortunately I've run into a mental roadblock. Questioning the legitimacy of the human engine seems at first a purely philosophical (and thus largely inapplicable) venture, my issue lies not with its nature but its practicality. If we are determining the interchange between subject and object, human and nonhuman, it is of course necessary to define 'human', and in many of these cases to define the human camp with Gell's form of agency. But I'm not sure what to do with this necessary physical mediation. The social manifests in ritual and objects, rocks become gods and the gods become the rocks (the transferral of qualities is something else that caught my eye here), physical extensions and networks of the many individual entities into the greater social entity, power and hierarchy; and these indexes of agency, these implications of authority, are visual and therefore physical by nature of their influence. So these indexes exist to mediate between humans, but what is the human state isolated from these symbiotic influences? I suppose it's more a question of whether it's at all possible to deal with a state minus these influences, whether this necessarily human quality can exist independently at all, or is only independent by virtue of the other influences existing in the first place.
To clear up some of my aimlessly wandering thoughts in class:
I take issue with Gell's argument of studying anthropological art separately from "'official' art institutions and recognized works of art", strictly because I believe that notions of such institutions and works of art are endlessly contested and therefore not possible to work away from.
To support the contesting of what official art institutions really are, I brought up the examples of: - The Honey Space Art Gallery in Chelsea and - Banksy, the British graffiti artist.
Both cases are examples of how the art world holds fluid definitions; Banksy's work is an interesting example of personhood in objects because his individual identity is unknown to the general public (which is how Shakespeare relates because 'his' works are still sometimes believed to be written by multiple playwrights).
Banksy's work (see the New Yorker article for an image) is also an interesting example of indexicality because it is often depicted as a realistic scene, when in fact it is merely spray paint on a wall (hence the broken wall picture in the beginning of the article which looks like it peeks into a tropical oasis but really doesn't).
17 comments:
http://www.ted.com/talks/view/id/216
very interesting talk by Howard Rheingold about human cooperation, and how new forms of media can shape the way we interact with humans..and non humans
"Howard Rheingold talks about the coming world of collaboration, participatory media and collective action -- and how Wikipedia is really an outgrowth of our natural human instinct to work as a group. As he points out, humans have been banding together to work collectively since our days of hunting mastodons."
Gell structures his discussion of art around ‘abduction of agency’ as a necessary mode for interaction with artifacts, casting humans into complex actor-effector networks of “distributed personhood”. If one is to be a ‘distributed person,’ though, the inaccuracies of the actor-artifact interface typical of the abduction mechanism are highly undesirable. One must know the real states of one’s components in order to function effectively. In the same way that one must be sure that the signals from one’s own body have concrete causal origins and associated definite meaning in order to choreograph any physical action, one must have confidence in the meaningful and significant nature of communication between distributed components.
Since these networked artifacts are incapable of reformatting the way they present the distributed person with signs of their presence, status and significance, it falls to the person to actively submit to the abstractions and abduction of causational logic needed for maintaining the necessary flow of information-signs between the components of the distributed individual.
A particularly interesting, uniquely modern and easily examined example is the virtualized computer graphical user interface (GUI), wherein the signs and modes of contact between the person and the computer is entirely abstracted from the realities of both the person’s intent and the computer’s mechanical functions. A human mind would never stratify information in the manner of a computer’s data structure, so the abstraction of ‘folders’ is introduced, allowing the human to interact with data stratification in a mode requiring little depth of functional understanding. What is significant is that for both the computer and the human, the idea of the ‘folder’ is an untruth, bearing little to no relation to the actual structures involved for either party, yet an untruth that allows the useful meshing of the computer’s mechanical effectiveness and the human’s ability to acquire and interact with data dynamically.
From this type of mechanism, it is interesting to note, arise useful formalizations that bear meaning exclusively in the context of the interface itself, with the ramifications accepted passively by either involved party. A good example of this is the ‘drag-and-drop’ concept. This bears analogical relation to human methodology, in that it standardizes a formal set of spatial relationships in a similar (albeit grossly simplified) graphical way to physical space, yet is obviously an artificial construct (i.e. no human would confuse physically moving items from one place to another with virtual drag-and-drop reallocation of data). The human, as such, must passively submit to the casual redefinition of physical and informational laws that is unique to this interface. Similarly, the computer must passively submit to the rules of data movement set by the interface, even though the binary operations involved are significantly more complex, and very differently structured than the graphical motion conducted by the actor-human.
It may seem that only the subject-interactor (in this case, the computer) performs this passive submittal to the unique laws of the interface. Certainly it is the case that the computer has no choice or agency in this submittal. It must be noted, however, that it is a bidirectional action of compromise that allows this interface to function at all. Consider the abject bewilderment on the part of many who use a computer for the first time, or those who have grown up unaccustomed to the laws of the GUI. Asking an elderly woman using a computer for the first time to ‘drag and drop’ something, ‘open’ a 'file', ‘double-click’ an ‘icon’… all these conventions are utterly confusing unless one has been trained in the ability to passively submit to them.
A key point of consideration is the fact that this formalized submittal to the interface is very distinct from any actual knowledge of the partner-interactor, other than the general knowledge of its existence. While most moderns regularly utilize the GUI, it is an extremely small minority that actually knows how the formalized interactions of the interface restructure the physical data on the other side. Moreover, nothing in the GUI is aimed at communicating or training the human participant in an understanding of digital data structures, nor educating the computer in how a human thinks, instead forcing the two distinct and complex entities to communicate in a highly ritualized virtual arena. It must be noted, lastly, that this paradigm is showing signs of change with the advent of adaptive interface technologies. It will be very interesting to note the directions this gradual progression takes, as well as the impact it has on the very concept of ‘human’ and ‘computer.’
The idea of art being "non-humans as distributed humans" is very relevant to blogging and other kinds of internet communication. In Art and Agency, Gell explains “distributed personhood” – the idea that, like cicada with their shed exoskeletons, people too have parts of themselves not necessarily attached by tissue or muscle. The blog world is full of such excuviae, in the sense that blogs are a space where people map out parts of themselves, their lives, their interests. Such excuviae serve as indexes, “entit[ies] from which the observer can make…an inference about the intentions or capabilities of another person” (13). Blogs whose authors have abandoned them or forgotten the password, but which nonetheless remain posted on the internet for the public to see, probably most fit the Gell-ian concept of excuviae. Because of their temporal and mental distance from their authors, abandoned blogs better fit the description of excuviae as “physically detached fragments of…‘distributed personhood’ – that is, personhood distributed in the milieu, beyond the body-boundary” (104).
In this sense, excuviae sorcery seems like it could be analogous to internet interaction. “The interest in excuviae sorcery,” Gell explains, “is that it forges a direct link between the index as an image of the prototype, and the index as a (detached) part of the prototype” (104). Though it seems intuitive and obvious that someone’s instant message or facebook comment originates directly from a “speaker,” internet communication does create fragments of someone’s thoughts and words, distinct from the speaker him- or herself. What is typed has the potential to be permanent in a way that spoken words (unless they are recorded) do not. There is also the potential to be anonymous – and thus further detached the index from the person – by using pseudonyms to make excuviae (somewhat) untraceable to their authors. “Excuviae sorcery is possible,” writes Gell, “because of the fact that as the body grows, it sheds its parts, and these become distributed around the ambience” (108). It is clear from Gell’s description of the generation of simulacra as “the shedding of ephemeral skins from all things induced by a kind of “pushing” from within” that these “parts” do not have to be physical, organic material (108). In this sense, blogs are a part of the hau of the internet.
The idea of blogs as indexes and excuviae is strengthened by Gell's discussion of witnessing as agency. Gell uses the Hindu concept of darshan to illustrate how sight can be seen as “an ‘extromissive’’ sense, the eye sending out invisible beams or rays through the air” (117). “Seeing creates a physical bridge between one being and another” (117). Because blogs are visible, and often visible to anyone among the huge public of the internet, blogs enable the creation of countless physical bridges between being and the excuviae or indexes of other beings.
Facebook is another example of an index. Facebook profiles are often meticulously sculpted and arranged by their agents, to convey a certain, specific impression to others. Facebook seems like a kind of excuviae, but I think it would be more accurate to call facebook, specifically the facebook profile, an idol. An aniconic idol, specifically, because the facebook profile is not supposed to represent a human figure, but, rather, the personality, habits and values of the person being represented. Facebook profiles are not worshipped in a religious sense, but they do embody the idea that “eye-contact, mutual looking, is a basic mechanism for intersubjectivity because to look into another’s eyes is not just to see the other, but to see the other seeing you (I see you see me see you see me etc.)” (120). This eye-contact effect applies more, I think, to the relationship between an individual and his or her own profile, in that people look at their own profiles not as representations of themselves (as subject) but as other people would see their profile (as objects). This comparison that I’m drawing is definitely limited – it’s debatable to what extent a viewer of a facebook profile feels seen by the person represented by the facebook profile – but I do think it lines up roughly with Gell’s ideas.
A potential criticism of this analogy I’m drawing between internet communication and excuviae would be that the properties I describe as properties of blogs are in fact properties of any written material. I think that is certainly true, following Gell’s proposal that things that are created serve as indexes of their creators. However, there are two ways in which blogs seem to go a step further into Gell’s definition of excuviae than the bulk of written material does. First, the internet, like the Maori forest, is a space that the public understand as housing, among other things, the excuviae, or hau, of internet users. There is no such expansive, universal and universally accessible space for other kinds of written material. Second, the fact of universal accessibility makes possible an almost infinite number of connections – witnessings and interactions – between indexes, primary agents, secondary agents and patients, and this possibility does not exist with other kinds of writing.
- hannah schmidt
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/7248875.stm
this is cool!
will leave a real comment in a bit...
Megan
I'm taking a course on Conception and the Fetus, where we've been talking a lot about ideas of fetal personhood, how that's related to the use of ultrasound technology, and how pregnant women, their partners, and medical personnel react to and form relationships with these ultrasound images. In reading the chapters from Gell, I couldn't help but return to the idea of the ultrasound image, and it's status as a sort of idol in the religious sense Gell discusses.
Perhaps because I was a big fan of dolls as a child, I was really able to relate to the use of the little girl's doll to illustrate the idea that "persons form what are evidently social relations with 'things.' " Gell's argument of this social relationship humans form with 'things' goes beyond things that are "representation[s] of a human being, as a doll is." (18). The degree to which the image of a fetus on an ultrasound monitor is a representation of a human being can be debated. On the one hand, it can be (and is) argued that ultrasound images ARE representations of a human being (in the same way a photograph or painting of an adult is such a representation). On the other, the images produced by ultrasound technology often look less human, in a way, than even the little girl's doll.
In talking about idol worship, Gell states, "thus, in image-worship, the devotee does not just see the idol, but sees herself (as an object) being seen by the idol (as a subject). The idol's 'seeing' is built into the devotee's own self-awareness at one remove as the object which is seen by the idol." (120). During an ultrasound in the US, it is not uncommon for technicians or the future parents to claim that "the baby's waving hello!" or, if a fetus is positioned so that its sex cannot be determined, it might be said that "the baby is modest!" or "uncooperative". Similarly, if a good view of the face cannot be found, the fetus might be termed "camera shy" or "not wanting his picture taken." Clearly, these are attributes projected onto the ultrasound image by humans. In a sense, we might think of the ultrasound image as an idol, and the humans looking at the ultrasound as worshippers of that image. That a move of a fetal hand is seen as a wave hello is akin to the devotee "see[ing] herself being seen by the idol." The ultrasound image can no better see the pregnant woman than a stone idol can see its devotee.
Gell maps out his argument of art as index in chapter 2. It indexes multiple phenomena, including representation of another person or object, aesthetic value, the responsibility of the creator of the work of art, and other cultural entities and phenomena that come to mind when in contact with the art.
Of particular interest to me is the discussion of eyes in art and artistic representation. Gell makes the point that viewers, even non-religious viewers speak of art using vocabulary fitting to a subject with agency. The art is 'looking at me' or some other acting verb. Gell also speaks of the eyes specifically when discussing Hindi Darshan and the experience of looking at the idol and having it look back. "Darshan is thus very much a two-way affair. The gaze directed by the god towards the worshipper confers his blessing; conversely, the worshipper reaches out a touches the god. The result is union with the god, a merging of consciousness according to the devotionalist interpretation." (117) According to Caraka, we "indeed have only one sense, the sense of touch, of which sight, hearing, etc. are just more subtle forms." (117) Seeing, like touching, is a form of contact...
This is something very much palpable when viewing art and my favorite part of the piece...
Gell’s work was very interesting, although I felt that Chapter 2 was a bit easier to follow than Chapter 7. On the whole, it was tougher to get through than past readings.
I feel that Gell has a strong grasp on the practical and “logical”, in that he understands that it is somewhat controversial to propose that a piece of art is an agent. He works through this in a careful and methodical manner. I like his emphasis on “physical mediation, which always does exploit the manifold causal properties of the ambient physical world…” (20), showing the important link between what one thinks, and how that is manifested onto the world.
In Chapter 7, I really enjoyed his discussion on Darsan, as I took a class on Hinduism last semester. There is certainly a lot of prejudice against image-heavy religions, and a lot of misunderstanding. I think that it is important for people to understand the way in which the idols are viewed within their religious context (in accordance with Gell’s distinction between items that are biologically alive versus spiritually alive). Furthermore, I was intrigued by his explanation that certain rituals gain meaning because they are so unique and unusual (i.e. the washing, dressing, and fanning of idols).
Gell had many points to make, and it was a little hard sometimes to understand how they all fit together under a similar theme. I feel that it would be very helpful to discuss in class how his many different ideas come together.
~Samantha
As a whole I found the Gell really engaging and interesting to work through. His theory is a useful piece to read in the beginning of our explorations into posthuman relationships, because it gives a clear and detailed anthropological and ethnographic look into the specifics of how these complications and issues are exercised within one area - visible (art) indexes.
Of particular interest was Gell's final conclusion that the infinite and unconscious transfers between humans and 'works of art' allow for the possibility that both can fill the same role in "networks of human social agency", and be seen as "almost entirely equivalent" (153). This discrepancy between the biologically living/non-living and the ability to index and hold agency brings into question one of the fundamental tools that we use to view the world around us. To stop seeing divisions within things based on six scientific characteristics of life (cells, organization, energy use, homeostasis, growth, and reproduction) and instead recognize that all things are living in this different meaning of the word.
I find the word abduction perfect for this task of transferring agencies between things because if we no longer consider ourselves living in the same biological manner then so much of our agency is taken away (for we can't claim to have the ability to dominate non-living items within the environment). Looking from the other perspective though, it gives humans much more agency because the amount of life strains and indexes that we 'touch' are greatly increased. This means more access to things external to us and with that we in turn have more ability to reflect that agency into other patients (retracing the cycle of changing patients and agents).
First of all, "Machines to Match Man by 2029," they will even make us smarter! : http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/7248875.stm
I was very interested in Gell's understanding and acknowledgment of perspective. At the beginning of Chapter 2, he includes a discussion of art as social because it springs from and engages with the human mind, which is itself social, in that it is only comprehendible in a social context. He implies that our perceptions of art are directly related and exchanged for our our perceptions of society. This chapter resonated with me in that Gell seemed aware of society's relationship with art. Something about art, even more so than other objects, strikes our cognition and allows us to not only assign it human qualities but also treat it like a person.
As an object, art can become an expression of idolatry. Interesting thought, especially in just having understood Godelier's definition of idolatry as giving a material more "agency" and human authority than actual human beings (whatever those may be). In fact, this article engaged with Godelier quite often in that respect, in that there is a discussion of humans ascribing agency to art, or rather surrendering our own agency and gifting it to an object.
Gell mentions this "attribution of agency" as human agency manifested in materials by way of human use, perception or even idolatry. Because objects cannot themselves be "self-sufficient agents" insofar as they do not have social minds or consciousness, they hence become secondary agents, wrought with the authority and the importance that humans perceive them to have in a social context.
Art, especially, is placed in a higher level of materialism wherein it receives equality and at some points, idolatry from human beings. In our society, we often assign art intentions (qualification for agency). We say that art contains messages breathed in by the (human) artist. On Page 23, Gell makes the interesting point that "art objects manufactured by human beings are not believed to have originated in that way; they are thought to be of divine origin or to have mysteriously made themselves." This took me back to Latour, who, in an explanation of nonhumans speaking as actors for humans said: "Novelists claim that they are forced to write either by a muse or by the sheer impulse of the characters themselves... novelists play the expressive role of medium" (pragmatogonies, 794). All of this points me to Godelier's idea of using materials to express or construct an imaginary personality. We use objects not only practically but expressively, so much so that they become our stand-ins, and we as humans (our bodies, perhaps even our minds) become the less important factors of society.
Central to Gell’s argument about the power of the “art object” is the idea of reflection, as in the type of reflection that is familiar to us through a mirror. A reflection itself is distorted and can never equal that which it is representing; as opposed to the actual object or person being reflected, the reflection itself is always a distorted vision of the original. Gell explains, “eye-contact, mutual looking, is a basic mechanism for intersubjectivity because to look into another’s eyes is not just to see the other, but to see the other seeing you…” (p. 120) The cycle continues on infinitely and the struggle for dominance is a conflicting and often contradictory one. If I am looking at the object, then I am the observer and that object becomes subject to my gaze. However, as soon as I realize that the object is looking back at me, I become subject to the object that can now see me watching it and I lose the larger control.
By using this example of the mirror an object or work of art creates into the lives of those who created the object, Gell argues that those objects are in themselves mediators intertwined yet independent from agency on a pure human to human level. The issue of sight is inherently significant when discussing objects; if one is to say that an object has the capacity to embody a certain power, it is necessary to also say that the physical existence of the object is vital in determining its character. Yet there is an extent to which an object can never be trusted; there is always the question of whether the art-object is a reflection or is being reflected, and is therefore full of a level of distortion that is inescapable. If the object sees, then who are we to say that their vision of us is less true or real than our superimposed vision of ourselves on them?
I found Gell’s arguments and theories running a close encounter to Bruno Latour. In particular when he discusses the agency of art and objects is reliant on the social relations within a given context. That is, in the social it is the human agent who brings inferences or “abductions” to art objects that are seen as an “indexical sign” for a particular meaning which is highly dependant upon the context. Gell proceeds to discuss this notion in relation to religion and things that are endowed with scared meanings. I was completely drawn into this idea as Gell writes, “Humanity has a lien on God because his objectification is in their hands.” To me, I understand this statement as saying that without the human agency that idolizes images or scared objects then the agency that these non-human things take on would be obsolete. Therefore, this is why the agency of objects is relational within humanity, and also without the religious context an image of God would just be a picture perhaps taking on meaning (agency) in a different context... It is weird to view religions with this theory in mind, as I have, and am sure many others as well, come from so sort of religious background. Yet, once you wrap your mind around this notion it makes complete sense.
On that contextual note, a friend of mine works in a gallery in Chelsea that specializes in contemporary art. And it is amazing to discuss with her the high monetary value a specific art community places on these art objects. Yet, remove the context and put the artwork in another setting, the pieces are likely not be seen with the same agency as they are viewed when put in the gallery in Chelsea. Also, this particular gallery that she works at the name of it has its own agency in that art buyers will simply agree to a price just because of its connection to the gallery. In that sense the gallery has more or less morphed into brand, label that was mediated my human agency.
Gell's coup de grace occurs, in my opinion, on p. 103: "We suffer, as patients, from forms of agency mediated via images of ourselves, because, as social persons, we are present, not just in our singular bodies, but in everything in our surroundings which bears witness to our existence, our attributes, and our agency." This is a brilliant example offered by Gell to explain why people irrationally resist how we are represented, via photos, for example. (S. Kracauer makes a similar argument in On Photography about 'reification,' and Adorno would put a twist on this notion in his own discussion of 'mimesis'... both Kracauer & Adorno actually would agree with Gell, but the harmful effects of this kind of 'mimetic representation' for K & A were more real, as they wove into this a political element... more on this in class...)
As apt as this example is, I admit I am not fully convinced of Gell's hypothesis, although it's original and brilliant. Perhaps I'm being pig-headed about it, but it seems as though he's building his case upon unsound foundations. Namely, how index & abduction works. Actually, I have no problem with the notion of 'index.' I also understand that from a common-sensical perspective, the process of abduction happens. All the time, in fact. But as Gell himself admits, the proceess of abduction is a logical fallacy. If P then Q does NOT necessarily mean Q then P. It may or may not, as Gell himself is well aware of. Yet Gell fails to make this fine distinction in the rest of the essay. Example: "Any artefact, by virtue of being a manufactured thing, motivates an abduction which specifies the identity of the agent... manufactured objects are 'caused' by their makers, just as smoke is caused by fire (p. 23) NO. Just as the smoke may or may not be caused by fire (can be caused by dry ice, let's say) the manufactured objects may or may not be caused by their makers.
What's problematic here is that this line of argument allows Gell to make the agent-patient variables fluidly fungible. I'm not ready to accept that unless the logical crease is straightened.
The Toyota analogy was a perfect example of this. I can surely understand how Gell gets on with his Toyollie, but I sure don't feel that way with my car. But I felt that way with other objects before. I think this only proves that abduction is not a necessarily true conditional process. Which is also the reason why I cannot really accept his notions about mines and soldiers as given in this excerpt from his book. I agree that the mines are conduits (Gell's own term, which I think is perfect) but the transference of agency from person to thing is built on shaky grounds, at least from what I read so far.
Towards the beginning of Chapter 2, Gell establishes how “things” can act as social agents using the examples of a small girl’s doll and a family car. He says that a young girl’s relationship with her doll is “an archetypal instance of the subject-matter of the anthropology of art.” While I found this to be an interesting and hilarious example, I’m hesitant to fully accept Gell’s portrayal of this relationship…I’m not sure how important this is - I don’t think that his oversimplified portrayal of the girl-doll relationship undermines his overall arguments about art and agency, although he does seem to jump from girl-doll to adult-sculpture very quickly and I wanted to think a little more about this foundational example.
Gell writes, “Consider a little girl with her doll. She loves her doll. Her doll is her best friend (she says).” Gell assumes this behavior to be typical, but it strikes me as sort of the stereotypical little girl behavior in a movie. Important to the little girl’s relationship with her doll, which relates to how the doll is a “representation of a human being,” is the little girl’s perspective on the world, which includes a different understanding of the self in relation to other people and objects. When I was young, I wasn’t best friends with my dolls, but I spent hours doing serious “operations” on them for various serious illnesses. My fascination with dolls had a lot to do with a confusion about the ways that that dolls were or were not different from myself and my family, and I didn’t view them with the same awareness of their object-ness that a museum attendee would view David. In fact, when I think about it, to some extent I might have had an easier time following Gell’s arguments if I still retained some of that childhood mindset where I did view dolls as both patients and agents at different times. Perhaps growing up and being “socialized” has made it harder for me to recognize the agency of objects that I used to fully accept. Now that I’m writing this post, I do think that the relationship between little girls and dolls is an interesting one to study in regard to agency and social relationships between people and “things,” though because of the important disparity between the mindset of a child and the mindset of an adult, I think it’s a little unfair when Gell asks, “But what is David if it is not a big doll for grown-ups?”
Gell’s analysis makes clear many of the questions and misconceptions I’ve been struggling to work through. Though I’m still unpacking the implications of what I’ve read, his conception of ‘index, abduction, primary agents, agent/patient relations etc.’ finally makes it possible to visualize the stuff we’ve been talking about in class. I had mostly been confused (or perhaps taken a bit too literally) the idea of symmetry between people and objects. I hadn’t been clear in what sense ‘symmetry’ was being used. I’ve interpreted Gell’s argument to imply that people and things might be symmetrical in the sense that one can not exist without the other, or an organism cannot exist without its vital organs. Yet, these components differ in their individual functions (as there are primary agents and secondary agents) which are to be distinguished from ‘happenings’ and physical laws. What they share in common is the idea that both people and things are entities with “the capacity to initiate causal events in his/her vicinity.” (21). For me, this subtle distinction is a totally different way of seeing everyday objects I rely upon. Something I haven’t quite grasped then is : what are the implications of reascribing agency (the capacity to initiate causal events) to non-human objects? How does this change the way I interact with them?
We're running into the recurring theme of complete autonomy in respect to the concept of 'self'. Not in the sense of this concept being independent of other definitions, or the constructed schemes of interaction for these other defined things, but in the sense of it having a sovereign self-hood. Godelier referenced this in his explanation of the necessity for the 'human' quality endowed on a sacred object - thus suggesting an inherent 'human' origin, a base template of sorts. On the other hand, Latour understands this inherent humanity not as the elemental engine of all things but as a definite part, an identifiable role in the mechanics of the social construct. Gell's lands somewhere inbetween, where humans are cogs in the clockwork, and still perhaps the engineers (however unintentional) of their part in the machine, his 'agency' and so forth is dependent on the assumed presence of the human intiative, that which finds the found objects, that first pushes the rock down the hill.
Unfortunately I've run into a mental roadblock. Questioning the legitimacy of the human engine seems at first a purely philosophical (and thus largely inapplicable) venture, my issue lies not with its nature but its practicality. If we are determining the interchange between subject and object, human and nonhuman, it is of course necessary to define 'human', and in many of these cases to define the human camp with Gell's form of agency. But I'm not sure what to do with this necessary physical mediation. The social manifests in ritual and objects, rocks become gods and the gods become the rocks (the transferral of qualities is something else that caught my eye here), physical extensions and networks of the many individual entities into the greater social entity, power and hierarchy; and these indexes of agency, these implications of authority, are visual and therefore physical by nature of their influence. So these indexes exist to mediate between humans, but what is the human state isolated from these symbiotic influences? I suppose it's more a question of whether it's at all possible to deal with a state minus these influences, whether this necessarily human quality can exist independently at all, or is only independent by virtue of the other influences existing in the first place.
To clear up some of my aimlessly wandering thoughts in class:
I take issue with Gell's argument of studying anthropological art separately from "'official' art institutions and recognized works of art", strictly because I believe that notions of such institutions and works of art are endlessly contested and therefore not possible to work away from.
To support the contesting of what official art institutions really are, I brought up the examples of:
- The Honey Space Art Gallery in Chelsea and
- Banksy, the British graffiti artist.
Both cases are examples of how the art world holds fluid definitions; Banksy's work is an interesting example of personhood in objects because his individual identity is unknown to the general public (which is how Shakespeare relates because 'his' works are still sometimes believed to be written by multiple playwrights).
Banksy's work (see the New Yorker article for an image) is also an interesting example of indexicality because it is often depicted as a realistic scene, when in fact it is merely spray paint on a wall (hence the broken wall picture in the beginning of the article which looks like it peeks into a tropical oasis but really doesn't).
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