Latour makes it clear that rather than creating artifacts and tools to mirror or reflect their purely cognitive culture, societies in fact derive much of their identity from, and are inextricably defined by their relations with these socialized nonhuman artifacts. This raises the question, then, as to how humans are able to extend their biological social networks so thoroughly into powerful, and moreover inherently useful ties with nonhumans.
I recently came across an interesting scientific article that may shed some light on this (see ref below)— Essentially, the primate mind is adapted to tool use in such a way that the neuron networks actually treat the ‘tool’ as a bodily extension of the hand (in this case pliers used by monkeys to grasp food), so treating the tool’s function as a reflex action. By this means, the brain is no longer required to actively choreograph the complex synchronization of functions, and is freed from the impractical effort of concentration that would otherwise discourage tool use.
It is quite possible, I would think, that humans use a similarly automated thought process to allow practical interaction with their vast array of socially networked artifacts. Indeed, to participate in such a varied spectrum of social interactions, wherein the interface between players is so often entirely symbolic or abstract would require an immense amount of concentration on the part of the human, were it not for some mechanism by which we render the nonhuman network a reflex extension of our selves.
See the full article http://sciencenow.sciencemag.org/cgi/content/full/2008/128/2 , the full research paper is available at the bottom, and is well worth a read if you’re comfortable with some science jargon.
I enjoyed these readings very much. Dant’s article was rather straightforward—I really enjoyed when he explained how even the smallest objects can have such a huge affect on us as a society (I am aware that both “object” and “society” are problematic terms, but let’s just say I’m using them in the way we may have all used them before joining this class), using the credit card and the birth control pill as examples. As for Ingold’s article, I felt frustrated because he presented a very logical argument, but his conclusions were a bit… problematic to say the least. It made me wonder whether he had been faulty in his logic, or whether I just wasn’t ready to accept his conclusion. Finally, Latour has become one of my favorite people ever—I absolutely adore his writing style. I think it’s important that he’s very straightforward about the fact that he’s not proposing THE answer, but rather AN answer, an alternative to the accepted norm. (A parallel to this is when I argue against people who believe that the Bible clearly states that homosexuality is immoral. I propose alternate ways of interpreting the passage, not to show that I have the *correct* answer, but rather that there are other ways of viewing the text.) His writing style is perhaps a bit more…. blunt than I’m used to, but after having read numerous journal articles, that’s fine with me. ~Samantha
As these readings unfolded their cleverly concealed only-possibly-revolutionary-if-you're-going-to-take-the-author-at-face-value-but-he-isn't-going-to-force-you-honest reconstructions of the 'sociotechnical' (sub 1, 6, 11, your pick) presumption I couldn't help but recall the previous models of conscious-unconscious subject relations we had invested our theories in. Most obviously the presumption of the cognitive human opposed to the senseless object.
But that is not the only human-material paradigm to have crossed our consciousness in the past few thousands of years, and I wonder how things such as animism and fetishism factor into this alternative structure. The former grants objects a conscious of their own, while the latter grants objects a similar potency but only by virtue of the original human conscious.
Animism as the 'pre-modern' conception of a world where all things exist in a state of potential-meaning (as say, potential kinetic energy?) appears to suggest a much more fluid state of affairs between object and human, where the use of a thing is dependent on the relationship between the human potential and the object's potential. Though we tend to see this as an outdated, ritual-ridden farce of a theory, perhaps the application of it to the new texts might render them more lucid. Is this idea of a fuzzed line between human and thing so very new after all? At some point in time we extended the definition of interior-exterior properties to include the membership of those other than humans, even those other than animals. Things once had an undeniable, recognized seat in the social heirarchy. We just hadn't sat down and defined it as such (defining and exposition being the characteristic of 'modern' society?).
Fetishism on the other hand is almost a caricature of the object-entity presented in the texts. The idolization of a thing, giving it power more potent than any other person's could ever be. And by what virtue other than human contribution of super-social dignities?
I suppose I'm just concerned with how jarring this revelation of material culture really has to be. Or at least, it seems we have been on the track of identifying the object in a more personal sense in the past (and continuing into the present), but we have perhaps never been so acutely aware of it. At least in the academic sense - though that is a more 'modern' attitude than any other I can name.
Sev's right: Bruno Latour is a deity. His discussion of Pragmatogonies kept me completely enthralled, interested and convinced. His style of presenting pure theory and "myth" instead of empirical truth is interesting: I was completely drawn in to the idea of using myth and imagination to speculate social development. He's clear about the symmetrical give-and-take relationship between nonhumans and humans, the necessity to invoke past, present and future simultaneously in thinking about objects, nature and humans. He explains how we speak for nonhumans and they for us, begging the question, 'what is so human about humans?' He slightly asks why objects, especially those with human qualities, are left out of the fold of being labeled human.
So what constitutes a human? Dant's article, largely about the need within sociology to understand materiality as not only undoubtedly social but also pivotal in defining the meaning of society, looks at objects as governing social behavior. But while objects define the development of collective society, they also silently define us as individuals. I'm reminded of the fact that the brain is programmed to almost ignore the fact that we are always wearing clothes. I'm reminded of my tattoo and piercings. While this use of objects (litterally embedded into our skin!) as definition of personality has always intrigued me, I am even more interested in exploring how humans have utilized nonhumans in this fundamental way, but still kept materiality out of the category of the social.
I was particular struck by Ingold's article. As I was reading it, I had this horrible feeling wash over me of "oh my god, everything I've ever been taught is wrong..." It was frustrating because, while I can follow his argument, step-by-step, I get to the end and everything felt off. I wanted to flat-out disagree with him, but I couldn't pinpoint exactly what I disagreed with. His discussion of cultural differences being biological frustrated me. On page 379, Ingold states "only the characteristics of the genotype, and not those of the phenotype, are carried across generations." He then argues that the genotype is "in the mind of the biologist" (382). Later, he denies that cycling is a phenotype because it is a skill that "is passed on from one generation to the next." (385) His rejection of the importance of biology or genetics is difficult for me to reconcile. Although his point is well taken that the ability to walk is not inherent in humans, any more than riding a bicycle is, and that instead it is a skill that must be learned. However, I cannot place aside the fact that the human body is "built" (in a way) to facilitate bipedalism, rather than getting about on our hands and knees, for example.
Latour asks us to “suspend our knowledge of what constitutes the human subject and the nonhuman object.” I’m convinced that this is the only way to think about humans because we are still too close to nature to possibly be an oppositional force to it. That is to say, in order to oppose nature we must be able to completely extract ourselves from it to be “complete” or fully evolved humans. According to Dant, the way to do this is to continue on the track of increasing cultural acceptance of objects until our human form becomes meaningless and only that which we as humans created is meaningful. In discussing Elias’s argument about the body, Dant describes the “emerging process of separating individual bodily functions,” where humans will learn to dispose of unproductive parts of the body and extend the body through more efficient “brain” pieces, otherwise known as machinery.
Today technological advances are slowed by the morality of civilization. To take away the “natural” part of human existence is to promote a controlled cognitive ability but simultaneously we are already in the process of being overtaken by the inanimate object. Despite efforts to control our surroundings, history has caught up to humans and our intention to dominate over our environment and surrounding inanimate world has instead caused humans to severely depend on the inanimate world. Latour explains it in terms of ‘primitive’ and ‘civilized.’ Two once oppositional words have now been inverted to mean close to the same thing, as we move towards an escape of all that is natural. If this is truly the case, we are destined to become mere subjects to the technology that we created, once it gains the capacity to function independently.
I found it interesting that all three of the readings started with some kind of acknowledgement of the doubt that the article might instigate in readers or some kind of unsubtle demonstration of the author’s personality. Ingold announces that he will start his article with “a facetious question,” Latour decides that he is “going to take a totally unreasonable and speculative path” and Dant says that it is “so much the better” if he can provoke anger, and thus debate, in his readers. I found that this awareness in the articles of how the arguments about the relationships between humans and nonhumans might undermine the long-held notions of readers (as they certainly did according to the above posts in this blog) made the articles more approachable. Still, I can’t help thinking about how it’s these qualities that we associate with “humanity”, such as having a sense of humor and sense of self-awareness, that helped me understand the material covered in an article about the connections between humans and non-humans.
One thing that particular struck me in Dant’s article was this line: “It is likely that future historians will identify relatively small items that we take for granted, as having the most significant civilizing effects…but their impact is difficult to gauge close to.” This sentence is in the section where Dant describes changes in the process of material civilization in late modernity, but I think that Dant’s example based on the historical record reveals the author’s own late modern perspective. Even though he’s talking about something else, he implies how objects are both a significant source of knowledge about past societies that effect how humans view the world, and how the objects used by contemporary society will be studied in the future to learn about the humans who used the objects.
There were many things in the Dant article that I found intriguing. I really liked how he explored the notion of interdependence that the consumption of Western societies have with other less industrialized societies. In other words, as I sit here typing away on my computer, my human action depended upon the human and non-human agencies that it took to construct this technological object. As I shop for food or clothes my choice of purchase relies on the farmers to pick and ship food or a factory worker (usually somewhere in China, Malaysia, etc..) to assist in the production of those must-have shoes or that out-of-season fruit. Not to mention all the other agents, human and non-human, in between that allowed for a given object to be on the shelf at my local shopping center.
Dant writes, “…as material objects are interposed between us and other members of our society in networks and systems there is a lengthening of the chains of interdependence that connect us to more and more distant others.” I found this statement highly relevant because of the constant introduction of technological devices with internet access, such as –i-phones, blackberries, etc… which seek for the human agent to have the world at his/her fingertip. Anything we need is easily found by a touch of a button. But this sense of individual action blurs the line of our larger connection and dependence on the machines and factory workers who play a role in facilitating this human action.
As Morgan Parker stated, I absolutely agree that Bruno Latour is rather brilliant. I think his article ended up being my favorite of the three, although I enjoyed the others too. I think the reason for my preference was first off his writing style, that is witty and clear without sacrificing the complexity of the points he is attempting to make. I also found that his alternate trajectory from "early man" (I guess you could call it....) to present-day man was extremely interesting. It made me rethink a lot of the assumptions of evolution and history that are taken for granted. (I may note here that Ingold's exploration of the dichotomy between these two terms further pushed them into a territory where assumptions get broken down.....). The inclusion of non-human materials and aspects of life as a valuable and necessary part of our development was presented in a way that made the horizontal changes and relationships between human and non-human things the focal point and most important region for change. I found this very a compelling and thought-provoking alternative to the commonplace system of human evolution we see as fact.
I found Latour’s paper challenging but fascinating. I looked up Homo faber (there is much to be said, I’m sure, for the swapping of properties between wikipedia and myself) to learn that the term refers to the concept of man as a maker, a creator of his environment through tools. In other words, Homo faber seems connected to the premise that society is man-made, socially constructed. Latour rejects the concept of society as socially constructed, showing how that concept is redundant. He goes on to show, by explaining his own pragmatogony, how the Homo faber concept is a flawed mythology.
Latour’s eleven steps “into the mists of pragmatogony” trace the development of “the sociotechnical,” the swapping of properties between human and nonhuman. The odd-numbered steps trace the state of social relations, while the even-numbered steps trace the state of nonhuman relations, and Latour’s explanations describe the complex web of crossovers between steps and categories – the swapping of properties between humans and nonhumans. The middle column in Fig 2 (804), Latour explains, represents the most important feature of these steps: the crossovers between society and techniques. This chart made his argument a lot clearer to me.
Latour's concluding statement that things don't "mediate our social action" - but that rather, things are us - unsettling, and I've thought a lot about why that idea disturbs me. I can't pinpoint what bothers me, but it has something to do with the idea of "myself" - an autonomous entity with a soul, free will, the capacity for love and empathy and creativity (and, clearly, a great deal of naivete) - being so closely enmeshed with something inanimate, things without "real" feelings or thoughts. I'm sure that through out this course, I will think more about what it means to lack a clear, comfortable definition of "human" as separate from the rest of the junk on the planet.
I found Ingold’s paper easier to grasp but no less fascinating – I think I understand where Emily is coming from with her sense of everything she’s ever been taught suddenly collapsing in on itself. Ingold rejects the traditional scientific premise that genotype is carried down through generations whereas phenotype does not get passed down, showing how socializing behaviors of cultures can account for phenotypic traits being passed down. His point, Ingold says, is that “human beings are not naturally pre-equipped for any kind of life; rather, such equipment as they have comes into existence as they live their lives, through a process of development” (379). My problem with Ingold’s thesis is his argument that two organisms with identical genomes do not “contain” the same template. This argument doesn’t sit right with me – while I understand his point that environment and context and socialization have huge effects on any given organism, it seems that any pair of identical genomes has the potential to grow, under X and Y and Z conditions, into specific identical organisms. Am I misunderstanding his argument? It's quite possible that I didn't fully understand his point about the co-optation of information theory, and that that is the source of my confusion.
At the same time, I found Ingold’s conclusion that there is no point at which humans became humans very relevant to our discussion in class last week about the very concept of “human” as opposed to “nonhuman.” It makes sense to me that whatever marker scholars, theologians or anyone else might choose as the one development or feature that "made us human," is bound to be arbitrary and subjective. Both the Inglold and Latour readings seemed to suggest that the line between "human" and "nonhuman" is very murky waters indeed.
Since Ingold seems to have so far drawn the most negative attention, I would like to attempt a defense! What I understood (at least from what we have read so far) was that Ingold is not denying the total predictive capability of genes, but the idea of the gene divorced from its expression/realization in its situated environment. Initially, I too was confused by the statement ‘the genotype is in the mind of the biologist.’ I may still be wrong, but I interpreted that what he meant, was that the genotype alone is not the sole, authoritative indicator of fate (our IQs, hereditary disease, appearances, etc.). Here we see an example of the dualist paradigm, which all three of our authors are so fond:). Ingold seems to suggest that human/non-human relations should not be reduced or simplified but reexamined to account for the complexities of a dynamic interaction between the genotype and its development/expression in the phenotype.
I can think of a couple examples which support Ingold's claim, and I'm curious to hear from those with expertise in biology.
In most psyc classes for example, one now learns about the malleability of IQ (the many shortcomings of IQ testing as well). I remember one study which looked at the intelligence of children in Headstart programs. Researchers found that these low IQ children from low eonomic backgrounds showed a significant increase in their IQ after completion of the program, and another fall upon reaching high school when back in public school. In short they found no correlation between IQ and genes, and a large correlation between IQ and the environmental pressures.
I think the same could be argued for disease-related genes (depression, diabetes, autism, deafness etc.) On NPR recently, I heard a story about women who were genetically predisposed to breast cancer, or diabetes, but never saw their symptoms realized. Some possible explanations were attributed to diet, access to medication & other environmental factors. Also, what many healthy people consider to be ‘undesirable’ genetically passed conditions are not so bad for those who experience them on a daily basis. One example is the rejection of cochlear implants--the technology designed to help alleviate deafness--by many in the deaf community who are happy as they are. In accordance with environmental pressures, they have adapted new ways of living, and acquired new skills which enable them to function successfully. I'm curious if others can think of examples as to whether our views of the biological shortcomings we hope to eliminate with technology might in other situations pose an advantage?
Ingold's piece was really interesting, especially after just taking Prof. Shapiro's Human Species class. I don't know how orthodox that class is considered, but she certainly focuses more on the environment sparking changes in human behavior and physicality than on the biology of it all. Even as far as walking goes, we are given about eight different theories as to what created the desire or necessity to walk. Some possibilities were the physical environment, and some were related to tool use. I felt that Ingold exaggerated a bit. Dant mentions how small things make huge impacts on us and gave credit cards an example of one of them. I did a mini ethnography last year on how credit cards effected people's psychology and behavior. It would be fun to share it with the class. He left me wanting to do one on birth control now!
After reading these, in particular Bruno Latour's piece, I am looking towards the semester in relief. Latour's Pragmatogonies was surprisingly readable. And funny! He repeatedly dispells the notion that humans and nonhumans exist as polar from each other; that their interactions and influences are a series of exchanges, a series which he calls boring. They should instead be understood as complex and intimate. He outlines 11 stages through which he aims to dispel the "tyranny of the dichotomy between humans and nonhumans." All of this was very interesting to me, if only as an introduction to this unfamiliar notion. Much of it is very much over my head, but served to excite my interest. Speaking of over my head... the discussion of genotype and phenotype and DNA in 'People like us' was, again, fascinating, but not as fascinating as it could be had I the patience to unravel the argument. The argument about the capacity to walk and the capacity to cycle was very useful to me. I look forward to discussing it though- I think I need some more help in wrapping my head around it. This, while vaguely frustrating, is also thoroughly exciting. I agree that Dant's piece was strikingly straightforward- as others have noted. I enjoy the notion that as humans, we interact with society through the objects of society. That helped clear my thoughts a bit... Again I look forward to hearing class discussion. This is all new to me! Megan
This blog entry's title scared me, because I wrote a specific response to Dant's article in hopes of getting to discuss Latour more extensively in class. I loved Ingold and found his work easier to read, but that may be due to the fact that Sev assigned a lot of his stuff in Origins.
-----
My life as controlled by Hewitt Dining Hall
"The cultural response that attempts to reduce the violent consequences for others within the society of individual desires, involves a lengthening of the chains of interdependence between people. This happens not only through self-regulation because constraints remain external as legal sanctions (the speeding fine) and material forms (the speed bump)." (297-8)
In his paper, Dant discusses the regulation of mankind due to "artefacts that are designed to constrain or shape the actions of individuals on behalf of society as a whole." (297) While reading this, I began to think about restraints on my life, entering a train of thought that began in the Barnard Library, at approximately 9 PM. It was then that I realized that my lifestyle is heavily bound by Barnard's rules and regulations, in a way that fits Dant's description adequately.
Consider this: Due to the winter cold, I am forced to retreat underground in order to get to classes. In a cruel twist of fate, the lower levels of the Quad, where I live, have as of this year been cut off from the rest of the tunnels (Constraint #1). There is, however, one loop hole: Hewitt Dining Hall, located three floors below mine, has an elevator that allows access to Hewitt and, subsequently, the Quad. Unfortunately, the only way to get to this elevator is to enter Hewitt Dining Hall (Constraint #2) with a proper Barnard ID card (Constraint #3) and an appropriate meal plan programmed into the card (Constraint #4). On top of that are the Dining Hall’s hours (Constraint #5), which are usually 9 AM to 11 PM, Sunday to Friday.
In Ingold's article, I felt that the most interesting and compelling analysis had to do with the DNA, how the theory of information as developed by Wiener, et al., which is essentially meaningless, became a code that was to be semantically understood and decoded by molecular biologists... interpreting a "book of life," as it were.
But I remain deeply skeptical of Ingold's view, especially as I find his arguments and logic reductive. Ingold tries to establish that the idea of the 'anatomically modern human' is an 'analytic fiction' stemming from the problems inherent in modern evolutionary biology. Ingold is often right, especially when he maintains that certain traits (bipedalism, for example) have developed via both endogenous and exogenous factors. Yet, perhaps driven by a desire to prove his point, Ingold at times does away with the fact that there certainly exists the endogenous factors; notice the sweeping generalization in his statement, that both walking and speaking are "techniques of the body," formed in and through the developmental process." It seems clearly wrong to me when he claims that "human beings are not naturally pre-equipped for any kind of life."
Language, for instance. Ingold denies that the capacity for language itself is problematic, that it is a "product of enculturation rather than... biological endowment." I can't agree with this assessment; it stems from both enculturation and biological endowment. I am no expert in the matter, but even a cursory reading of Pinker or Chomsky would clearly establish that the human neural control of vocal tract is unique, biologically, in facilitating the faculty of language. Also, recursion in communication system is an evolutionary trait that is unique to humans; it is a biological fact that this recursive ability did not develop past the visual cognition in some non-human animals.
Also, Ingold should perhaps bring into the discussion recent influential studies by Herb Terrace and others that show the chimpanzees are not really displaying a capacity for language, but a certain pattern expectancy & gaze-following, etc., which would really discredit his claim on page 377.
I found Ingold's article very thought-provoking, but poorly reasoned/misinformed at times.
16 comments:
Latour makes it clear that rather than creating artifacts and tools to mirror or reflect their purely cognitive culture, societies in fact derive much of their identity from, and are inextricably defined by their relations with these socialized nonhuman artifacts. This raises the question, then, as to how humans are able to extend their biological social networks so thoroughly into powerful, and moreover inherently useful ties with nonhumans.
I recently came across an interesting scientific article that may shed some light on this (see ref below)— Essentially, the primate mind is adapted to tool use in such a way that the neuron networks actually treat the ‘tool’ as a bodily extension of the hand (in this case pliers used by monkeys to grasp food), so treating the tool’s function as a reflex action. By this means, the brain is no longer required to actively choreograph the complex synchronization of functions, and is freed from the impractical effort of concentration that would otherwise discourage tool use.
It is quite possible, I would think, that humans use a similarly automated thought process to allow practical interaction with their vast array of socially networked artifacts. Indeed, to participate in such a varied spectrum of social interactions, wherein the interface between players is so often entirely symbolic or abstract would require an immense amount of concentration on the part of the human, were it not for some mechanism by which we render the nonhuman network a reflex extension of our selves.
See the full article http://sciencenow.sciencemag.org/cgi/content/full/2008/128/2 , the full research paper is available at the bottom, and is well worth a read if you’re comfortable with some science jargon.
--ryder onopa
I enjoyed these readings very much. Dant’s article was rather straightforward—I really enjoyed when he explained how even the smallest objects can have such a huge affect on us as a society (I am aware that both “object” and “society” are problematic terms, but let’s just say I’m using them in the way we may have all used them before joining this class), using the credit card and the birth control pill as examples. As for Ingold’s article, I felt frustrated because he presented a very logical argument, but his conclusions were a bit… problematic to say the least. It made me wonder whether he had been faulty in his logic, or whether I just wasn’t ready to accept his conclusion. Finally, Latour has become one of my favorite people ever—I absolutely adore his writing style. I think it’s important that he’s very straightforward about the fact that he’s not proposing THE answer, but rather AN answer, an alternative to the accepted norm. (A parallel to this is when I argue against people who believe that the Bible clearly states that homosexuality is immoral. I propose alternate ways of interpreting the passage, not to show that I have the *correct* answer, but rather that there are other ways of viewing the text.) His writing style is perhaps a bit more…. blunt than I’m used to, but after having read numerous journal articles, that’s fine with me.
~Samantha
As these readings unfolded their cleverly concealed only-possibly-revolutionary-if-you're-going-to-take-the-author-at-face-value-but-he-isn't-going-to-force-you-honest reconstructions of the 'sociotechnical' (sub 1, 6, 11, your pick) presumption I couldn't help but recall the previous models of conscious-unconscious subject relations we had invested our theories in. Most obviously the presumption of the cognitive human opposed to the senseless object.
But that is not the only human-material paradigm to have crossed our consciousness in the past few thousands of years, and I wonder how things such as animism and fetishism factor into this alternative structure. The former grants objects a conscious of their own, while the latter grants objects a similar potency but only by virtue of the original human conscious.
Animism as the 'pre-modern' conception of a world where all things exist in a state of potential-meaning (as say, potential kinetic energy?) appears to suggest a much more fluid state of affairs between object and human, where the use of a thing is dependent on the relationship between the human potential and the object's potential. Though we tend to see this as an outdated, ritual-ridden farce of a theory, perhaps the application of it to the new texts might render them more lucid. Is this idea of a fuzzed line between human and thing so very new after all? At some point in time we extended the definition of interior-exterior properties to include the membership of those other than humans, even those other than animals. Things once had an undeniable, recognized seat in the social heirarchy. We just hadn't sat down and defined it as such (defining and exposition being the characteristic of 'modern' society?).
Fetishism on the other hand is almost a caricature of the object-entity presented in the texts. The idolization of a thing, giving it power more potent than any other person's could ever be. And by what virtue other than human contribution of super-social dignities?
I suppose I'm just concerned with how jarring this revelation of material culture really has to be. Or at least, it seems we have been on the track of identifying the object in a more personal sense in the past (and continuing into the present), but we have perhaps never been so acutely aware of it. At least in the academic sense - though that is a more 'modern' attitude than any other I can name.
~Emma C.
Sev's right: Bruno Latour is a deity. His discussion of Pragmatogonies kept me completely enthralled, interested and convinced. His style of presenting pure theory and "myth" instead of empirical truth is interesting: I was completely drawn in to the idea of using myth and imagination to speculate social development. He's clear about the symmetrical give-and-take relationship between nonhumans and humans, the necessity to invoke past, present and future simultaneously in thinking about objects, nature and humans. He explains how we speak for nonhumans and they for us, begging the question, 'what is so human about humans?' He slightly asks why objects, especially those with human qualities, are left out of the fold of being labeled human.
So what constitutes a human? Dant's article, largely about the need within sociology to understand materiality as not only undoubtedly social but also pivotal in defining the meaning of society, looks at objects as governing social behavior. But while objects define the development of collective society, they also silently define us as individuals. I'm reminded of the fact that the brain is programmed to almost ignore the fact that we are always wearing clothes. I'm reminded of my tattoo and piercings. While this use of objects (litterally embedded into our skin!) as definition of personality has always intrigued me, I am even more interested in exploring how humans have utilized nonhumans in this fundamental way, but still kept materiality out of the category of the social.
I was particular struck by Ingold's article. As I was reading it, I had this horrible feeling wash over me of "oh my god, everything I've ever been taught is wrong..."
It was frustrating because, while I can follow his argument, step-by-step, I get to the end and everything felt off. I wanted to flat-out disagree with him, but I couldn't pinpoint exactly what I disagreed with. His discussion of cultural differences being biological frustrated me. On page 379, Ingold states "only the characteristics of the genotype, and not those of the phenotype, are carried across generations." He then argues that the genotype is "in the mind of the biologist" (382). Later, he denies that cycling is a phenotype because it is a skill that "is passed on from one generation to the next." (385) His rejection of the importance of biology or genetics is difficult for me to reconcile. Although his point is well taken that the ability to walk is not inherent in humans, any more than riding a bicycle is, and that instead it is a skill that must be learned. However, I cannot place aside the fact that the human body is "built" (in a way) to facilitate bipedalism, rather than getting about on our hands and knees, for example.
Latour asks us to “suspend our knowledge of what constitutes the human subject and the nonhuman object.” I’m convinced that this is the only way to think about humans because we are still too close to nature to possibly be an oppositional force to it. That is to say, in order to oppose nature we must be able to completely extract ourselves from it to be “complete” or fully evolved humans. According to Dant, the way to do this is to continue on the track of increasing cultural acceptance of objects until our human form becomes meaningless and only that which we as humans created is meaningful. In discussing Elias’s argument about the body, Dant describes the “emerging process of separating individual bodily functions,” where humans will learn to dispose of unproductive parts of the body and extend the body through more efficient “brain” pieces, otherwise known as machinery.
Today technological advances are slowed by the morality of civilization. To take away the “natural” part of human existence is to promote a controlled cognitive ability but simultaneously we are already in the process of being overtaken by the inanimate object. Despite efforts to control our surroundings, history has caught up to humans and our intention to dominate over our environment and surrounding inanimate world has instead caused humans to severely depend on the inanimate world. Latour explains it in terms of ‘primitive’ and ‘civilized.’ Two once oppositional words have now been inverted to mean close to the same thing, as we move towards an escape of all that is natural. If this is truly the case, we are destined to become mere subjects to the technology that we created, once it gains the capacity to function independently.
-Perri
I found it interesting that all three of the readings started with some kind of acknowledgement of the doubt that the article might instigate in readers or some kind of unsubtle demonstration of the author’s personality. Ingold announces that he will start his article with “a facetious question,” Latour decides that he is “going to take a totally unreasonable and speculative path” and Dant says that it is “so much the better” if he can provoke anger, and thus debate, in his readers. I found that this awareness in the articles of how the arguments about the relationships between humans and nonhumans might undermine the long-held notions of readers (as they certainly did according to the above posts in this blog) made the articles more approachable. Still, I can’t help thinking about how it’s these qualities that we associate with “humanity”, such as having a sense of humor and sense of self-awareness, that helped me understand the material covered in an article about the connections between humans and non-humans.
One thing that particular struck me in Dant’s article was this line: “It is likely that future historians will identify relatively small items that we take for granted, as having the most significant civilizing effects…but their impact is difficult to gauge close to.” This sentence is in the section where Dant describes changes in the process of material civilization in late modernity, but I think that Dant’s example based on the historical record reveals the author’s own late modern perspective. Even though he’s talking about something else, he implies how objects are both a significant source of knowledge about past societies that effect how humans view the world, and how the objects used by contemporary society will be studied in the future to learn about the humans who used the objects.
- Ariel
There were many things in the Dant article that I found intriguing. I really liked how he explored the notion of interdependence that the consumption of Western societies have with other less industrialized societies. In other words, as I sit here typing away on my computer, my human action depended upon the human and non-human agencies that it took to construct this technological object. As I shop for food or clothes my choice of purchase relies on the farmers to pick and ship food or a factory worker (usually somewhere in China, Malaysia, etc..) to assist in the production of those must-have shoes or that out-of-season fruit. Not to mention all the other agents, human and non-human, in between that allowed for a given object to be on the shelf at my local shopping center.
Dant writes, “…as material objects are interposed between us and other members of our society in networks and systems there is a lengthening of the chains of interdependence that connect us to more and more distant others.” I found this statement highly relevant because of the constant introduction of technological devices with internet access, such as –i-phones, blackberries, etc… which seek for the human agent to have the world at his/her fingertip. Anything we need is easily found by a touch of a button. But this sense of individual action blurs the line of our larger connection and dependence on the machines and factory workers who play a role in facilitating this human action.
-Kathryn
As Morgan Parker stated, I absolutely agree that Bruno Latour is rather brilliant. I think his article ended up being my favorite of the three, although I enjoyed the others too. I think the reason for my preference was first off his writing style, that is witty and clear without sacrificing the complexity of the points he is attempting to make. I also found that his alternate trajectory from "early man" (I guess you could call it....) to present-day man was extremely interesting. It made me rethink a lot of the assumptions of evolution and history that are taken for granted. (I may note here that Ingold's exploration of the dichotomy between these two terms further pushed them into a territory where assumptions get broken down.....). The inclusion of non-human materials and aspects of life as a valuable and necessary part of our development was presented in a way that made the horizontal changes and relationships between human and non-human things the focal point and most important region for change. I found this very a compelling and thought-provoking alternative to the commonplace system of human evolution we see as fact.
sar
I found Latour’s paper challenging but fascinating. I looked up Homo faber (there is much to be said, I’m sure, for the swapping of properties between wikipedia and myself) to learn that the term refers to the concept of man as a maker, a creator of his environment through tools. In other words, Homo faber seems connected to the premise that society is man-made, socially constructed. Latour rejects the concept of society as socially constructed, showing how that concept is redundant. He goes on to show, by explaining his own pragmatogony, how the Homo faber concept is a flawed mythology.
Latour’s eleven steps “into the mists of pragmatogony” trace the development of “the sociotechnical,” the swapping of properties between human and nonhuman. The odd-numbered steps trace the state of social relations, while the even-numbered steps trace the state of nonhuman relations, and Latour’s explanations describe the complex web of crossovers between steps and categories – the swapping of properties between humans and nonhumans. The middle column in Fig 2 (804), Latour explains, represents the most important feature of these steps: the crossovers between society and techniques. This chart made his argument a lot clearer to me.
Latour's concluding statement that things don't "mediate our social action" - but that rather, things are us - unsettling, and I've thought a lot about why that idea disturbs me. I can't pinpoint what bothers me, but it has something to do with the idea of "myself" - an autonomous entity with a soul, free will, the capacity for love and empathy and creativity (and, clearly, a great deal of naivete) - being so closely enmeshed with something inanimate, things without "real" feelings or thoughts. I'm sure that through out this course, I will think more about what it means to lack a clear, comfortable definition of "human" as separate from the rest of the junk on the planet.
I found Ingold’s paper easier to grasp but no less fascinating – I think I understand where Emily is coming from with her sense of everything she’s ever been taught suddenly collapsing in on itself. Ingold rejects the traditional scientific premise that genotype is carried down through generations whereas phenotype does not get passed down, showing how socializing behaviors of cultures can account for phenotypic traits being passed down. His point, Ingold says, is that “human beings are not naturally pre-equipped for any kind of life; rather, such equipment as they have comes into existence as they live their lives, through a process of development” (379). My problem with Ingold’s thesis is his argument that two organisms with identical genomes do not “contain” the same template. This argument doesn’t sit right with me – while I understand his point that environment and context and socialization have huge effects on any given organism, it seems that any pair of identical genomes has the potential to grow, under X and Y and Z conditions, into specific identical organisms. Am I misunderstanding his argument? It's quite possible that I didn't fully understand his point about the co-optation of information theory, and that that is the source of my confusion.
At the same time, I found Ingold’s conclusion that there is no point at which humans became humans very relevant to our discussion in class last week about the very concept of “human” as opposed to “nonhuman.” It makes sense to me that whatever marker scholars, theologians or anyone else might choose as the one development or feature that "made us human," is bound to be arbitrary and subjective. Both the Inglold and Latour readings seemed to suggest that the line between "human" and "nonhuman" is very murky waters indeed.
- Hannah
Since Ingold seems to have so far drawn the most negative attention, I would like to attempt a defense! What I understood (at least from what we have read so far) was that Ingold is not denying the total predictive capability of genes, but the idea of the gene divorced from its expression/realization in its situated environment. Initially, I too was confused by the statement ‘the genotype is in the mind of the biologist.’ I may still be wrong, but I interpreted that what he meant, was that the genotype alone is not the sole, authoritative indicator of fate (our IQs, hereditary disease, appearances, etc.). Here we see an example of the dualist paradigm, which all three of our authors are so fond:). Ingold seems to suggest that human/non-human relations should not be reduced or simplified but reexamined to account for the complexities of a dynamic interaction between the genotype and its development/expression in the phenotype.
I can think of a couple examples which support Ingold's claim, and I'm curious to hear from those with expertise in biology.
In most psyc classes for example, one now learns about the malleability of IQ (the many shortcomings of IQ testing as well). I remember one study which looked at the intelligence of children in Headstart programs. Researchers found that these low IQ children from low eonomic backgrounds showed a significant increase in their IQ after completion of the program, and another fall upon reaching high school when back in public school. In short they found no correlation between IQ and genes, and a large correlation between IQ and the environmental pressures.
I think the same could be argued for disease-related genes (depression, diabetes, autism, deafness etc.) On NPR recently, I heard a story about women who were genetically predisposed to breast cancer, or diabetes, but never saw their symptoms realized. Some possible explanations were attributed to diet, access to medication & other environmental factors. Also, what many healthy people consider to be ‘undesirable’ genetically passed conditions are not so bad for those who experience them on a daily basis. One example is the rejection of cochlear implants--the technology designed to help alleviate deafness--by many in the deaf community who are happy as they are. In accordance with environmental pressures, they have adapted new ways of living, and acquired new skills which enable them to function successfully. I'm curious if others can think of examples as to whether our views of the biological shortcomings we hope to eliminate with technology might in other situations pose an advantage?
Ingold's piece was really interesting, especially after just taking Prof. Shapiro's Human Species class. I don't know how orthodox that class is considered, but she certainly focuses more on the environment sparking changes in human behavior and physicality than on the biology of it all. Even as far as walking goes, we are given about eight different theories as to what created the desire or necessity to walk. Some possibilities were the physical environment, and some were related to tool use. I felt that Ingold exaggerated a bit. Dant mentions how small things make huge impacts on us and gave credit cards an example of one of them. I did a mini ethnography last year on how credit cards effected people's psychology and behavior. It would be fun to share it with the class. He left me wanting to do one on birth control now!
After reading these, in particular Bruno Latour's piece, I am looking towards the semester in relief. Latour's Pragmatogonies was surprisingly readable. And funny!
He repeatedly dispells the notion that humans and nonhumans exist as polar from each other; that their interactions and influences are a series of exchanges, a series which he calls boring. They should instead be understood as complex and intimate. He outlines 11 stages through which he aims to dispel the "tyranny of the dichotomy between humans and nonhumans." All of this was very interesting to me, if only as an introduction to this unfamiliar notion. Much of it is very much over my head, but served to excite my interest.
Speaking of over my head... the discussion of genotype and phenotype and DNA in 'People like us' was, again, fascinating, but not as fascinating as it could be had I the patience to unravel the argument. The argument about the capacity to walk and the capacity to cycle was very useful to me. I look forward to discussing it though- I think I need some more help in wrapping my head around it. This, while vaguely frustrating, is also thoroughly exciting.
I agree that Dant's piece was strikingly straightforward- as others have noted. I enjoy the notion that as humans, we interact with society through the objects of society. That helped clear my thoughts a bit...
Again I look forward to hearing class discussion. This is all new to me!
Megan
This blog entry's title scared me, because I wrote a specific response to Dant's article in hopes of getting to discuss Latour more extensively in class. I loved Ingold and found his work easier to read, but that may be due to the fact that Sev assigned a lot of his stuff in Origins.
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My life as controlled by Hewitt Dining Hall
"The cultural response that attempts to reduce the violent consequences for others within the society of individual desires, involves a lengthening of the chains of interdependence between people. This happens not only through self-regulation because constraints remain external as legal sanctions (the speeding fine) and material forms (the speed bump)." (297-8)
In his paper, Dant discusses the regulation of mankind due to "artefacts that are designed to constrain or shape the actions of individuals on behalf of society as a whole." (297) While reading this, I began to think about restraints on my life, entering a train of thought that began in the Barnard Library, at approximately 9 PM. It was then that I realized that my lifestyle is heavily bound by Barnard's rules and regulations, in a way that fits Dant's description adequately.
Consider this: Due to the winter cold, I am forced to retreat underground in order to get to classes. In a cruel twist of fate, the lower levels of the Quad, where I live, have as of this year been cut off from the rest of the tunnels (Constraint #1). There is, however, one loop hole: Hewitt Dining Hall, located three floors below mine, has an elevator that allows access to Hewitt and, subsequently, the Quad. Unfortunately, the only way to get to this elevator is to enter Hewitt Dining Hall (Constraint #2) with a proper Barnard ID card (Constraint #3) and an appropriate meal plan programmed into the card (Constraint #4). On top of that are the Dining Hall’s hours (Constraint #5), which are usually 9 AM to 11 PM, Sunday to Friday.
In Ingold's article, I felt that the most interesting and compelling analysis had to do with the DNA, how the theory of information as developed by Wiener, et al., which is essentially meaningless, became a code that was to be semantically understood and decoded by molecular biologists... interpreting a "book of life," as it were.
But I remain deeply skeptical of Ingold's view, especially as I find his arguments and logic reductive. Ingold tries to establish that the idea of the 'anatomically modern human' is an 'analytic fiction' stemming from the problems inherent in modern evolutionary biology. Ingold is often right, especially when he maintains that certain traits (bipedalism, for example) have developed via both endogenous and exogenous factors. Yet, perhaps driven by a desire to prove his point, Ingold at times does away with the fact that there certainly exists the endogenous factors; notice the sweeping generalization in his statement, that both walking and speaking are "techniques of the body," formed in and through the developmental process." It seems clearly wrong to me when he claims that "human beings are not naturally pre-equipped for any kind of life."
Language, for instance. Ingold denies that the capacity for language itself is problematic, that it is a "product of enculturation rather than... biological endowment." I can't agree with this assessment; it stems from both enculturation and biological endowment. I am no expert in the matter, but even a cursory reading of Pinker or Chomsky would clearly establish that the human neural control of vocal tract is unique, biologically, in facilitating the faculty of language. Also, recursion in communication system is an evolutionary trait that is unique to humans; it is a biological fact that this recursive ability did not develop past the visual cognition in some non-human animals.
Also, Ingold should perhaps bring into the discussion recent influential studies by Herb Terrace and others that show the chimpanzees are not really displaying a capacity for language, but a certain pattern expectancy & gaze-following, etc., which would really discredit his claim on page 377.
I found Ingold's article very thought-provoking, but poorly reasoned/misinformed at times.
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